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This paper is a result of a critical consideration of the crime of robbery with aggravating 
circumstances as defined in section 1(1) (b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. The 
historical origin and development of the crime was investigated. The development of the 
crime of robbery in South African law and the current law relating to robbery and robbery 
with aggravating circumstances were researched. Sentencing for the crime of robbery in 
comparison with robbery with aggravating circumstances in South African law is discussed 
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1.1 Purpose of the study 
The dissertation seeks to critically examine the legal position in respect of the crime of 
robbery with aggravating circumstances as defined in section 1(1) (b) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act (hereafter ‘CPA’)1. This examination of the legal position will be based on the 
Constitutional Court judgement in Minister of Justice and Another v Masingili and Another 
(hereafter Masingini).2 
    The examination conducted in this dissertation will serve to answer two burning questions 
pertaining to the crime of robbery with aggravating circumstances raised by the Masingili 
judgement. The first of these questions is whether an accomplice to a robbery with 
aggravating circumstances can be convicted of such crime even where the accomplice3 had 
no knowledge or intention of the aggravating circumstances. The second one is what effect 
the Masingili judgement has on the two stages of the criminal trial (i.e. verdict and sentencing 
stage).  
    This dissertation will be divided into four chapters including this introduction chapter, 
which evaluates the historical background of the crime of robbery with aggravating 
circumstances. In chapter two the paper will analyse the High Court as well as the 
Constitutional Court judgments in the Masingili case. Chapter three will involve the 
evaluation and the discussion of the two burning questions which are raised in the paragraph 
above. This will also include comments by the other writers on the Masingili judgement. This 
dissertation will be summed up and concluded in chapter four. 
 
1.2 THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ROBBERY 
1.2.1 Roman law 
In 1652 the Dutch East India Company came into the Cape, and they brought with them 
Roman-Dutch Law, which was a combination of Roman and Roman-Dutch law.  Roman 
laws had treated robbery not as a separate crime from a crime of theft.4 However, robbery 
                                                          
1 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
2 Minister of Justice and another v Masingili and another 2014 (1) SACR 437 (CC). 
3  S v Williams 1980 (1) SA 60 (A) 675, An ‘Accomplice’ was defined as someone who consciously associated  
   himself with the commission of the crime by the  perpetrator or  perpetrators by giving assistance at the  
   commission of the crime or by consciously supplying the opportunity, the means or relevant information  
   which furthers the commission of the crime.  The accomplice is not similar to the perpetrator since he does not  
   fulfil all the requirements in the definition of the offence he has become involved in it. 
4 JRL Milton. Criminal Law and Procedure Volume II Common Law Crimes. 3rd ed. (1996) 644. 
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was a special kind of theft called rapina (theft with violence). It provided special penalties 
and some special rules.5 In general, the same principles that applied to theft applied to 
robbery. 
       The main distinguishing feature between theft and robbery during the early times of this 
crime was the ‘violence’ element. This situation made robbery to be defined as an aggravated 
form of theft and it created a special delict, rapina, (theft with violence, with special penalties 
and some special rules.6  
 
1.2.2 Roman - Dutch law 
Early Germanic law regarded robbery differently because they treated it as a separate crime 
from theft and they called it raub.  During that period the punishment or sentence for robbery 
was less severe than the punishment for theft.7 In the sixteenth century the crime was 
redefined in Holland and they followed the Roman law of treating it as a special form of 
theft.8 That is theft from another person, where violence or the threat of force was used. As a 
result it was treated by the Roman-Dutch writers as simply theft with violence.  
      Both laws became part of the law of the Cape. Ultimately the Roman-Dutch law became 
part of South African Common Law.9 The book of Lansdown, South African Criminal Law 
Procedure states as follows: 
“The basis of South African criminal law is the Roman-Dutch law. When the pioneers sent 
out by the Dutch East India Company came to the Cape in 1652, they brought with them 
the laws in force in the province of Holland. This was, in the main, the Roman law 
modified by ancient custom and by statute.”10 
 
1.2.3 English law 
During the years when the Cape was under the control of Great Britain, Roman Dutch law 
continued to be in use in South Africa. The law remained in use but they were criticised by 
the judges of South Africa at the time for the lack in precision.11 
                                                          
5 Ibid. 
6 JM Burchell. Principles of Criminal Law. 4th ed. (2013) 706. 
7 PMA Hunt. South African Criminal Law and Procedure vol. II Common Law Crimes revised. 3nd ed. (1990)    
   644. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 CWH Lansdown, WG Hoal, and AV Lansdown South African Criminal Law and Procedure. Vol I 6th ed.  
   (1957) 5. 
11 Ibid at page 6. 
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       The appointment of judges who were schooled in the English legal tradition made 
matters worse for the Roman Dutch law. Since those judges were unacquainted with Roman 
Dutch law and they preferred to use English laws more. The changes made influenced and 
modified the Cape Laws. The judges at that time had even criticised the Roman Dutch law 
and they indicated that it was not certain on the crimes it covered and such uncertainty made 
it difficult for the court to draw the line between delict and criminal cases.12  
Early English law regarded robbery as a species of theft. However, it was treated differently 
in that, unlike a thief, a robber was supposed to stand trial in a secular court in England.13 
Originally the crime was theft accompanied with violence directed to the person of the 
victim.14 
       A new development in English law included the use of threat to the victim during 
robbery as the violence required for robbery. Robbery was then defined as the felonious 
taking of money or goods from the person of another, or in his presence, ‘by violence or 
putting fear’.15  
Such violence had to be directed towards the person of the victim and not the property. The 
violence had to be used with the intention of inducing submission to the taking and it had to 
precede and induce the taking.16 The English authority is found in the case of R v Donnally17, 
where the accused was convicted of robbery where he had threatened the victim with the 
accusation of sodomy, and that made the victim fearful. The court regarded that threat as the 
fear required as a violent element necessary for the crime of robbery. 
      The Larceny Act of 1916 codified the crime of theft in England. In terms of the Larceny 
Act section 23 codified the common law concept of “robs” which meant that the common law 
authorities continued to apply.18 Further, section 23 of the Act recognised different levels of 
robbery with different levels of punishment.  
In 1968 another development was brought into the crime of robbery and a new definition of 
robbery was found in the Theft Act19 which states that:  
                                                          
12 Hunt supra note 7 at 645. 
13 Milton supra note 4 at 645. During this time the English legal system was divided in religious and secular  
   courts. Religious courts dealt with spiritual issues. Secular courts dealt with civil and criminal cases and were  
   similar to our modern day ordinary courts. 
14 Milton (see note 4; 645). 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 R v Donnally (1779) 1 Leach 229, 168 ER 199. 
18 JRL Milton and PMA Hunt, South African Criminal Law and Procedure. 2nd ed. (1982) 678. 
19 Theft Act of 1968, Chapter 60, section 8. (English Legislation). 
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‘(1)A person is guilty of robbery if he steals, and immediately before or at the time of 
doing so, and in order to do so, he uses force on any person or puts or seeks to put any 
person in fear of being then and there subjected to force. 
(2) A person guilty of robbery, or of an assault with intent to rob, shall on conviction on 
indictment be liable to imprisonment for life.’ 
The above Act brought two new changes to the crime of robbery, namely that the person 
assaulted does not have to have any interest in the property and that the property needs to be 
seized from the property owner or their person.20   
 
1.2.4 South African law on robbery  
The South African version of the crime of robbery went through different phases. The history 
of it has its roots from English law and Roman Dutch law; and this can be followed by 
reading the paragraphs above on this chapter.  
       In the early stages of the development of South African law, the English common law of 
robbery influenced the South African courts. That was after the Roman-Dutch law seemed to 
be vague and hard to interpret. Subject to certain modifications, the English definition was 
adopted by the South African writers, Gardiner & Lansdown in 1919 that is to say:  
 ‘Robbery is theft, from the person of another, or in his presence, if the property stolen is 
under his immediate care and protection, accompanied by actual violence or threats of 
violence, to such person or his property or reputation intentionally used to obtain the property 
stolen or to prevent or overcome resistance to its being stolen.’21  
In turn, the above definition was influential in shaping the South African definition of 
Robbery at the time.22 
      Over the years the crime of robbery continued to be developed by the courts and writers.  
Therefore it is no longer the same as the one inherited from the Roman – Dutch law and 
English law. The current definition of robbery by Snyman is ‘theft of property by unlawfully 
and intentionally using violence to take property from somebody else; or threats of violence 
to induce the possessor of the property to submit to the taking of the property.’23 Many SA 
                                                          
20 Milton supra note 4 at 679. Further see the discussion of S v Yolelo below, for the current position in South 
African Law.  
21 Gardiner & Lansdown Criminal Law and Procedure. 6th ed. (1957) 1706. 
22 Milton supra note 4 at 646. 
23 CR Snyman. Criminal Law. 5th ed. (2002) 517. Snyman also states that the definitions from the book of Hunt  
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criminal law writers define robbery in the same way as Snyman. As a result of that this paper 
will use the above definition of robbery. 
       The above definition was used in the appeal court case of S v Salmans,24 where a cell 
phone was taken by force from the complainant’s hand, the case where the court decided that 
any force applied to the victim, however slight, will be sufficient to constitute robbery.  
The same definition above has also been used by Kemp, and he defined the elements of 
Robbery as theft, actual or threatened violence, causally linked to the theft, and an intention 
to acquire the property by means of violence.25 The distinguishing feature, therefore, of 
robbery when compared to theft is that robbery is theft accompanied by force or violence.26 I 
elaborate on this point immediately below.  
(i) Violence or Threat Requirement 
The violence required for the crime of robbery, must be directed at the victim. In the case of S 
v Makhalanyane27 the court stated that, ‘the object of violence will be to reduce the victim to 
impotence or submission.’ This means that the intention behind the violence or force must be 
to deprive the victim of any will to resist the taking of his property when robbery takes place.  
      In the case of S v Salmans28 the court stated that any force applied to the person of victim, 
however slight, is sufficient to constitute robbery. Milton goes on to interpret the word 
violence required for robbery as a term of art meaning no more than the use of force of any 
significant degree29. Hunt also stated that any violence which would consist of an assault will 
be sufficient as the violence required as an element of robbery, even the slight violence which 
had not caused an injury.30  In S v Yolelo31 the court said the violence required for the offence 
of robbery need not necessarily precede the taking of the property, but what is important is 
that there must be a relationship between the taking of the property and such violence.32  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
   and Milton on Common Law Crimes at page 642; and the book of Burchell and Milton, Principles of Criminal 
   Law at page 817 are substantially similar to his definition of robbery. 
24 S v Salmans 2006 (1) SACR 333 (A) 336. 
25 G Kemp… et al. Criminal Law in South Africa 2nd ed (2015) 392. 
26 Ibid. 
27 S v Makhalanyane 1980 (3) SA 425 (O) at 430 D. Also the case of R V Gesa; R v De Jongh 1959 (1) SA 234  
   (A) at 238. See also the book of Milton JRL Criminal Law and Procedure Volume II Common law crimes 3rd  
    ed (1996) at page 654. 
28 S v Salmans supra note 24. 
29 Milton (note 4; 651). 
30 Hunt (note 12; 682). 
31 S v Yolelo 1981(1) SA 1002(A).  
32 Milton (note 4; 646). Also take note of the comments by the court in the case of R v Magao 1959 (1) SA  
    489 (A), where the court stated that there must be a relationship between the act of violence and the theft. 
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       Based on the how the courts have expressed and applied the violence element of in the 
paragraph above, it becomes clear that the type of violence required for robbery is a special 
kind of violence. Even a slight degree of violence would be enough to prove the violence 
element required for the crime of robbery, this view was expressed in the case of S v 
Salmans33 
 
(ii) Theft requirement 
A completed crime of theft is an essential element of the crime of robbery. It involves the 
taking of property belonging to someone else with the intention to permanently deprive that 
person of the property.34Therefore if any of the essential elements of theft are lacking, 
robbery is not committed and the accused may face the charge of assault, if violence can be 
proven against the accused person.35  This element is not difficult to interpret and apply.  
 
(iii) Concluding remarks 
Milton states that it is difficult to analyse the elements of Robbery. He goes on to state that:-
‘Since robbery is a crime involving two acti rei, namely the taking of property and the 
performance of an act of violence upon the person of another.36 This duality lends a measure 
of complexity to the analyses and application of the elements of the crime that has ensured a 
continuing quality of ambiguous uncertainty about the crime, which sometimes leads to 
strange anomalies.’37  
The courts are struggling to apply these two elements consistently, as the crime requires two 
separate acts namely theft coupled with violence or threats. Each of these has their own 
separate requirements.38 What Milton state above was observed in Masingili case law, in the 
constitutional court and the high expressed different judgements. Chapter 2 would deal more 
with such judgements. 
 
 
                                                          
33 Hunt (note 7; 681) 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Milton (see note 4; 643). 
37 Ibid. 
38 See the article by S Hoctor, “Examining the expanding crime of robbery”, (2012)3 SACJ. This article has got  
    a discussion where the courts had been stating that bag and cellular phone snatching is not robbery but theft  
    and other courts in the country were saying it is robbery. The article and case laws quoted in it are a proof that  
    courts do sometimes find it difficult to apply the two acti rei elements of robbery (theft coupled with 
    violence). Further, there have been debates in legal fraternity and by courts as to how much violence is  
    required for theft to be robbery. 
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1.3  ROBBERY ‘WITH AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES’ 
Robbery with aggravating circumstances was introduced for the first time by section 1(b) of 
the Criminal Procedure Act 9 of 1958 which stated that: 
1) ‘In this Act, unless the context otherwise indicates- 
         ‘aggravating circumstances’ in relation to- 
   (b) robbery or attempted robbery, means- 
       (i)  the wielding of a fire-arm or any other dangerous weapon; 
      (ii) the infliction of grievous bodily harm 
 Robbery or an attempt to commit robbery with aggravating circumstances means using 
violence or threats of violence to seize another’s property.’ 
The reason the section was inserted into the Criminal Procedure Act in 1958 was to make 
robbery with aggravating circumstances to be a form of robbery with more serious 
consequences for sentencing.39 It gave court the powers to sentence the offenders up to death 
sentence40, but that does not necessarily mean that the court cannot exercise its normal 
sentencing discretion in order to decide the appropriate sentence.41 
       However, the interpretation of the meaning of robbery with aggravating circumstances 
by the court in R v Sisilane42 created a loophole in the law with regards to accomplice 
liability. A driver of a getaway car cannot simply be found guilty of robbery with aggravating 
circumstances because he was not party to the violence that constitutes the robbery to be of 
aggravating circumstances. The court reasoned that the absence of the words ‘by the offender 
or an accomplice’ in sub section (b) of the CPA 9 of 1958 meant that someone could be 
guilty of robbery with aggravating circumstances only if he or she instigated or otherwise 
made him or herself a party to the aggravating circumstances.43 Schreiner JA held that in his 
view para (b) of section 1 of Act 9 of 1958 should not be read as if the words ‘by the offender 
or an accomplice’ appeared in it.44  He then held that the aggravating circumstances were not 
proven against the appellant (accomplice in the robbery). The case was sent back to the trial 
court to consider the appropriate sentence other than death sentence. 
                                                          
39 S v Moloto 1982 (1) SA 844 (A) at 850 C. 
40 Hunt (note 7; 689). 
41 Ibid. 
42 R v Sisilane 1959 (2) SA 448 (A). 
43 Ibid at para 451 G. 
44 Ibid at para 453 H. 
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      In R v Cain,45 the court decided that the amendment brought by section 1 of Act 9 of 1958 
to the CPA was in respect of sentencing of the person who committed grievous bodily harm 
during robbery or attempted robbery. The suitable sentence prescribed was a death sentence. 
Again the in the case of R v Cain mentioned above the court also opened a loophole for the 
accomplice liability in a case of robbery with aggravating circumstances. The appellate 
division stated that the State must prove the person who used the fire arm and shot 
(aggravating circumstance) the victim of robbery, during the time when victim was robbed. 
The State had failed to prove the shooter and this resulted to the appellant’s conviction of 
robbery with aggravating circumstances being changed by the Appellate division.  
      The court made it clear that such an inquiry will always be a question of facts, depending 
on the circumstances of a particular case. The court went on to state that in robbery the mere 
possession of  a weapon by the accomplice does not per se constitute aggravating 
circumstances required for the crime of robbery with aggravating circumstances. It went on 
and stated that if however a dangerous weapon is used by an accomplice in the commission 
of the robbery and it is proved that the perpetrator had prior knowledge, that the accomplice 
was carrying such weapon, both participants can be found guilty of robbery with aggravating 
circumstances. This case of R v Cain set the tone on the interpretation of robbery with 
aggravating circumstances on cases when it is not the main perpetrator who uses the 
aggravating circumstances (weapon) during the commission of the crime of robbery but it is 
the accomplice.  
 
1.3.1 The Criminal Law Further Amendment Act 75 of 1959 
In 1959, the Legislature remedied the loophole created by R v Cain46 and R v Sisilane.47 This 
was achieved by the insertion of the words ‘by the offender or accomplice, on the occasion 
when the offence is committed, whether before, during or after the commission thereof’ at the 
end of section 3 (b) of Criminal Law Further Amendment Act.48 This resulted to section 3 of 
the Act49 made to read as follows: 
a) ‘By the addition or extension into paragraph (a) of the definition of “aggravating 
circumstances” of the words “on occasion when the offence is committed, whether 
before, during or after the commission thereof… 
                                                          
45 R v Cain 1959 (3) SA 376 (A). 
46 Ibid. 
47 R v Sisilane supra note 42. 
48 Act 75 of 1959. 
49 Ibid. 
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b) Robbery or an attempt to commit robbery means the infliction of grievous bodily harm 
or any threat to inflict such harm, by the offender or accomplice, on the occasion 
when the offence is committed, whether before, during or after the commission 
thereof’.50 
The amendment made the legislatures objectives or intentions to be clear, that is in respect of 
accomplice liability, on cases of robbery with aggravating circumstances, was that an 
accomplice could now be convicted of robbery with aggravating circumstances, as the Act 
now expressly stated that fact. In S v Dhlamini51 Appellate Division expressed that: 
‘this amendment meant that an accomplice to robbery is guilty of robbery with 
aggravating circumstances even if he or she did not instigate or make him or herself party 
to the aggravating circumstances and even if he or she did not have intent as to the 
aggravating circumstances.  The same applies in reverse which, for convenience, I call the 
“mirror-image case.’  The perpetrator of a robbery is guilty of robbery with aggravating 
circumstances if the accomplice committed the aggravating circumstances, even if the 
perpetrator did not make him or herself a party to the commission of the aggravating 
circumstances and even without intent.”52  
It is this paper’s view that the Constitutional Court in Masingili followed the approach 
adopted by the court in 1974 in the case of S v Dhlamini and that resulted to the 
Constitutional Court not to develop the crime of robbery to a new level of the current 
constitutional era. The Appellate Division in S v Dhlamini held, that the purpose of the 
amendment Act 75 of 1959; s 3 (b) was to block the loophole created by the Sisilane and 
Cain cases.53 Further the same case of S v Dhlamini also came with the principle of mirror 
image cases, for accomplice liability in cases of robbery with aggravating circumstances. 
       In R v Jacobs,54 the court, when interpreting ‘aggravating circumstances’ for section 1 
(1) (b),55 stated that: “The aggravating circumstances are established objectively and the 
intention of the accused is irrelevant into an enquiry as to whether aggravating circumstances 
are present. This case is relevant in helping to interpret whether aggravating circumstances 
                                                          
50 Ibid.  
51 S v Dhlamini 1974 (1) SA 90 AD. 
52 Ibid at 94B-C. 
53 S v Dhlamini supra note 51 at 95D. 
54 R v Jacobs 1961 (1) SA 475 (A). 
55 Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 9 of 1958. 
Page 17 of 48 
 
are present in a particular case. The court said upon a proper construction of section 1(b) it is 
a question of fact whether aggravating circumstances are present in a particular case.”56  
This case of R v Jacobs above was used by the constitutional court to decide that the intention 
is not required to prove the presence of aggravating circumstances, for the crime of robbery 
with aggravating circumstances.  
 
1.3.2 The Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 
In 1977 a new CPA57 was introduced which repealed the whole of the Act 56 of 1955 
including its amendments except for section 319 (3) and 384. This resulted to the current 
definition of aggravating circumstances in terms of section 1(1) (b) of the Criminal Procedure 
Act.58 The ‘aggravating circumstances’ are defined for the purposes of robbery or attempted 
robbery as follows:  
‘(i) the wielding of a fire-arm or any other dangerous weapon; 
(ii) the infliction of grievous bodily harm; or 
(iii) a threat to inflict grievous bodily harm’. 
By the offender or an accomplice on the occasion when the offence is committed, whether 
before or during or after the commission of the offence.’59 
The CPA of 1977 has codified the principle set out in S v Mbele60 by expressly stating any 
conduct involving the wielding of a firearm or any dangerous weapon will be considered as 
aggravating circumstances for the purpose of section 1 (1) (b) of the Act. 
 
1.3.3 Concluding remarks 
In conclusion, the crime of robbery has got its own elements that must be proven, likewise, 
the ‘aggravating circumstances’ also has its own requirement. In terms of sentencing they do 
not carry the same sentences. Robbery with aggravating circumstances has got harsher 
sentences and the minimum term of imprisonment is 15 years imprisonment. As a result, the 
criminal law amendment Act 105 of 1997 will be applicable in cases of Robbery with 
aggravating circumstances.61Recently, the Constitutional Court was called to interpret the 
                                                          
56 R v Jacobs supra note 54 at para 478. 
57 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.  
58 Ibid at s 1 (1) (b). 
59 Ibid. 
60 S v Mbele 1963 (1) SA 257 (N). 
61 See, Criminal law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 s 51 (2) (a) (hereafter also referred to as the Minimum  
    Sentence Act). 
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meaning of ‘aggravating circumstances’ in terms of section 1 (1) (b), in the case of 
Masingili.62 The ruling of the Court will form the core part of this dissertation paper. 
 
CHAPTER 2:  
SUMMARY OF THE MASINGILI CASE 
This chapter will discuss the Constitutional Court decision in Masingili.63 This chapter will 
give a background of the litigation history of the case in question through summarising the 
judgments of the initial Magistrate court decision up to the Constitutional Court judgment. 
The main objective of this chapter is to give context to the arguments that will follow namely; 
whether or not robbery with aggravating circumstances is different from robbery, whether an 
accomplice to a robbery with aggravating circumstances be convicted of such crime even, 
where the accomplice had no knowledge or intention of the aggravating circumstances (does 
section 1(1)(b) of the CPA create strict liability?) and what is the effect of this Constitutional 
Court judgment on the two stages of a criminal trial. This decision under discussion is crucial 
as the Constitutional Court was required to assess the validity of an order granted by the 




In October 2009 the four accused hatched a plan to rob a shop in Table View, Cape Town. 
First accused entered into a shop wherein she was acting as a scout and assessing if the shop 
was busy in order to determine if a robbery was feasible. After that she went on to inform the 
other accused that the complainant (shop owner) was alone and they can proceed to rob the 
shop. Second accused acted as the getaway driver and throughout the robbery he did not 
leave the getaway vehicle. It emerged from the evidence that the third and fourth accused 
proceeded to go into the shop and pretended to be interested in buying a pair of jeans from 
the shop owner.66  
As the complainant was looking for the correct pair of jeans the accused had asked for, the 
third accused proceeded to produce a knife and to demand that the complainant give him all 
                                                          
62 Masingili supra note 2. 
63 Ibid. 
64 S v Masingili and others 2013 (2) SACR 67 (WCC). 
65 P Stevens “Robbery with aggravating circumstances revisited: Minister of Justice and Constitutional   
    Development and Another v Masingili and Another 2014 (1) SACR 437 (CC)” (2014) 2 SACJ. 
66  S v Masingili and others supra note 64. 
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the money she had. The two men then tied her up and put her in the toilet. She could hear 
them searching for money inside the shop. When she managed to free herself and get out of 
the toilet and saw them running away from the shop. She screamed and followed them. As 
the two robbers were running away the complainant saw that the owner of the neighbouring 
shop was also chasing after the accused. By chance there was a police vehicle which was on 
patrol and passing by the shop within a few minutes of the robbery. When the officers 
stopped to ask what had happened they were informed by the complainant that she had been 
robbed and she proceeded to describe the getaway car of the accused. The police officers 
pursued the vehicle and managed to apprehend and arrest all the four accused. 
 
2.2 Findings of the Regional Court 
In the court a quo, the trial Magistrate, after evaluating the evidence of the state witnesses in 
some depth, found that the witnesses gave credible evidence and accepted their evidence into 
record.67 The Magistrate concluded that from the evidence adduced, the State had proved 
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused were guilty of robbery with aggravating 
circumstances and that all four accused ‘partook in this robbery’. The regional court came to 
the conclusion that all the accused were guilty and convicted them on a charge of robbery 
with aggravating circumstances, and each received different sentences.  The accused then 
appealed to the Western Cape High Court against their convictions and sentences. First and 
second accused appealed the judgment on the basis that the state had failed to prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that the two hand intention with regards to the aggravating circumstances 
and that 1(1) (b) of the CPA was unconstitutional as it created liability without fault. 
 
2.3 Findings of the High Court 
On appeal to the Western Cape High Court, it was held that the second appellant (Mr Volo) 
who had been the driver of the getaway vehicle and the first appellant were equally as guilty 
of robbery as accomplices as the third and fourth applicants who actually carried out the 
robbery. The Court, however, went on to find that the State had failed to prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that the accomplices had an intention with regards to the aggravating 
circumstances. The question that arose from this finding is whether the definition of 
aggravating circumstances creates strict liability (i.e. liability without intention or negligence) 
in respect of the crime of robbery with aggravating circumstances, in which case it may 
                                                          
67 Ibid. 
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infringe on the following sections in the Constitution68: section 12 (1) (a) (“right to freedom 
and security of person“) and section 35 (3) (h) (“the presumption of innocence).”69 
      In examining the relationship between the section 1 (1)(b) of the CPA and the right to 
freedom and security of person, the court relied on the case of S v Coetzee and others70  in 
which O’Regan J set out the attitude of the courts to strict liability. The general principle of 
our common law is that criminal liability arises only where there has been unlawful conduct 
and blameworthiness or fault (the actus reus and mens rea).  The court had to consider 
whether the interpretation of the above mentioned provision with regards to robbery with 
aggravating circumstances creates strict liability on the part of an accomplice or perpetrator 
who has intention with respect to the robbery but who does not have intention with respect to 
the perpetration of the aggravating circumstances. In arriving at its judgment the court relied 
on the judgment handed down in S v Legoa wherein the court stated that  
 “Where the accused was charged with robbery, the question whether the robbery was 
committed with aggravating circumstances had to be determined as part of the verdict - 
that is, as part of the court's finding on guilt or innocence in the first stage. The 
aggravating circumstances were elements of the form of the offence of robbery with which 
the accused was charged. Hence they had to be proved in the first stage of the trial, and the 
finding regarding their presence or absence was part of the main verdict. Their presence or 
absence accordingly had to be decided by the Judge with the assessors (or, before the 
abolition of juries, by the jury).”71 
The Court went on to follow the ratio in  S v Legoa, that the question of whether a robbery 
was committed with aggravating circumstances had to be determined as part of the verdict 
and not as part of the sentencing stage of a trial.72 In Legoa court held that it is obligatory on 
the State to prove the perpetration of the aggravating circumstances during the stage of the 
trial culminating in the verdict, and not during sentencing.  
The Court in Masingili further held that the phrase “or an accomplice” in the impugned 
provision does create strict liability with respect to the offence of robbery with aggravating 
circumstances.73  This means that in the case where a perpetrator is liable because of the 
                                                          
68 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996: (hereafter referred to as The SA  
    Constitution). 
69  S v Masingili and others supra note 64. 
70 S v Coetzee and others 1997 (3) SA 527 CC. 
71 S v Legoa A 2003 (1) SACR 13 (SCA) at page 21 para 17. 
72 S v Masingili and others supra note 64 at page 79 para 42. 
73 Ibid at page 81 paras 48 to 50. 
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presence of aggravating circumstances, an accomplice to the robbery may also be convicted 
of robbery with aggravating circumstances even if he or she had no intention in that regard, 
and vice versa.74  It was therefore held that section 1 (1) (b) of the CPA infringes the right to 
freedom and security of person.75 
      The court in its judgment then further held that the inclusion of the phrase “or an 
accomplice” in the impugned provision infringes the presumption of innocence. This is 
because the inclusion of the phrase or accomplice violated the right to be “to be presumed 
innocent, to remain silent, and not to testify during the proceedings” in section 35(3) (h) of 
the Constitution.76 The High Court went on to conduct a section 36 limitation analysis77 in 
order to establish whether the limitation was justifiable in an open and democratic society. 
The court found that the infringement of the rights to a fair trial in this situation cannot be 
justifiable under the limitation clause. This is because the limitation analysis has to weigh 
whether or not purpose, effects and importance can justify infringements to the Bill of Rights. 
The court went on to declare section 1 (1) (b) of the CPA to be constitutionally invalid and, 
as such, the hearing of the appeal in the high court was suspended pending the finding of the 
Constitutional Court.  
 
2.4  Findings of the Constitutional Court 
The matter was then referred to the Constitutional Court for two issues.  First on the basis of 
section165 of the Constitution for a confirmatory order of the decision of the High Court 
decision that found section 1 (1) (b) of the Criminal Procedure Act creates strict criminal 
liability (or liability without fault) and is thus unconstitutional. The second issue that was 
before the Court was an appeal by the Minister of Justice and the National Prosecuting 
Authority, and the basis of the appeal was that the High Court misinterpreted section 1 (1) (b) 
of the CPA in that it treated robbery with aggravating circumstances as a crime separate from 
robbery, and that it failed to consider that aggravating circumstances are only considered after 
satisfying the requirement of robbery and were are relevant for sentencing.78  
       The Constitutional Court identified four points it had to deal with in its judgment, these 
points were central in getting to its judgment on the issues that were before it. The points the 
                                                          
74 S v Masingili supra note 64 page 79 para 40. 
75 Ibid from page 75 para 31 to page 77 para 35. 
76 The SA Constitution supra note 68. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Masingili supra note 2, at page 457 para 59. 
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court identified were the following: (i) the meaning of section 1 (1) (b) of the CPA, (ii) 
whether or not the section creates strict liability, (iii) whether or not robbery with aggravating 
circumstances was a separate crime from robbery and (iv) whether or not accomplices can be 
held accountable in terms of the doctrine of common purpose. 
      The Constitutional Court in Masingili held that intent or fault element should be proven 
as a definitional element for robbery at a first stage of the trial, and therefore it is not a 
required for the state to prove intent to use aggravating circumstances as a definitional 
element for robbery with aggravating circumstances.79 Furthermore, the Constitutional Court 
held that robbery with aggravating circumstances is not a separate criminal offence, distinct 
from robbery.80 And it further decided that the objective existence of aggravating factors, 
such as the use of a dangerous weapon is relevant for sentencing, but must be proved before 
conviction, for reasons of fairness and practicality. It further held that even if the words ‘or an 
accomplice’ were not present the first and second respondent could still have been guilty of 
robbery with aggravating circumstances based on the ordinary common-law rules of 
accomplice liability. It held that the words or accomplice in the section 1 (1) (b) of CPA were 
only relevant for mirror image cases.81 As a result the Court went on and defined the phrase 
‘mirror image cases’ to mean cases wherein the accomplice is the one who carries out the 
aggravating actions before, during or after the robbery. It went on to state that robbery with 
aggravating circumstances is a form of robbery with more serious consequences for 
sentencing. This distinctive form of robbery is not to be confused with a completely different 
offence. 
      The absence of intention regarding the aggravating circumstances on the part of an 
accused may be taken into account during sentencing and may result in the imposition of a 
lighter sentence than the statutorily prescribed minimum.  Even when it does not, the 
statutory determination that the existence of aggravating circumstances calls for a harsher 
sentence than what would be appropriate for mere robbery, does not amount to the arbitrary 
deprivation of freedom, or deprivation without just cause.82  
      The Court went on to state that Section 12 (1) (a) of the Constitution is not contravened, 
nor is section 35 (3) (h) violated because the accused must still have criminal intent for 
robbery (itself a violent crime), and whether the accused intended the aggravating 
                                                          
79 Ibid at page 457 para 59. 
80 Ibid at page 449 para 34. 
81 Ibid at page 445 para 23. 
82 Ibid at page 457 para 59. 
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circumstances will be relevant to sentencing.83It was accordingly held that section 1(1) (b) of 
the CPA does not explicitly require any mental element in relation to the aggravating 
circumstances, but rather refers to objective facts constituting aggravating circumstances. The 
latter was held not to offend the presumption against strict liability as intent is already a 
requirement for robbery. With reference to the latter, the court stated as follows: “Violence is 
inherent to the crime of robbery, so intent to commit robbery subsumes intent to commit 
violence (or to threaten to do so).”84  
The court held that aggravating circumstances are a measure of the level of the violence used 
in the commission of the offence of robbery. Therefore, it decided that section 1 (1) (b) of the 
CPA does not create a requirement of intent with regard to the aggravating circumstances. 
      In conclusion it was held that robbery with aggravating circumstances is not a separate 
crime distinct from robbery. The objective existence of aggravating circumstances such as the 
use of a dangerous weapon becomes relevant for sentencing but should be proved before 
conviction for reasons of fairness and practicality.85 Further the Constitutional Court held that 
section 1 (1) b of the CPA does not create strict liability with regards to aggravating 
circumstances. The Constitutional Court in Masingili, in its order, did not confirm the 
decision of the High Court that section 1 (1) b of the CPA was unconstitutional and further 
went on to uphold the appeal by the Minister of Justice.  
 
2.5 Concluding remarks  
The Constitutional Court effectively overturned the High Court declaration of 
unconstitutionality with regards to section 1 (1) (b) of the Criminal Procedure Act. In its 
Judgment the Constitutional Court decided that the High Court had erred in finding that the 
section in question created strict liability with regards to aggravating factors. It went on 
further to state that section 1 (1) (b) of the Criminal Procedure Act neither violated the 
presumption of innocence clause in terms of the SA Constitution nor did it create a distinct 
crime of robbery with aggravating circumstances separate from robbery. The issue of 
intention will be discussed further in chapter 3 later of this paper. 
 
 
                                                          




Page 24 of 48 
 
CHAPTER 3:  
ANAYISIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURT JUDGEMENT IN MINISTER OF 
JUSTICE AND ANOTHER V MASINGILI AND ANOTHER 
This decision of the Constitutional Court in Masingili cannot be viewed as correct, and this 
paper does not support the way it interpreted or applied section 1 (1) (b) of the CPA, on 
accomplice liability. This chapter will firstly discuss the relationship between accomplices 
and perpetrators as these two are central concepts in the discussion of this paper.  
 
3.1 General discussion of the Accomplice and Perpetrator liability 
Historically our courts did not distinguish between accomplice and perpetrator liability for 
both verdict and sentencing in a criminal trial.  The example of such fact was seen in the case 
of Rex v M and Another,86 where Juta JA, stated the following:-"All persons who knowingly 
aid and assist in the commission of a crime are punishable just as if they had committed it.” 
However, this common law principle has since been changed by our courts; our criminal law 
now treats perpetrators and accomplices as different concepts.  
      Presently, at common law an accomplice is defined as a person who does not satisfy all 
the requirements for liability contained in the definition of a crime.87 Simply put, an 
accomplice, although he or she willingly participates in a crime, does not meet all the 
requirements required to be successfully found guilty of the crime in question.Hence, the 
criminal liability of accomplice is therefore auxiliary in nature and is reliant on the 
perpetrator’s liability. 
      In the recent case of S v Kimberly and Another88  the court explained that although 
perpetrators and accomplices are all participants to a crime, but the perpetrator is the person 
who performs the act that constitutes that particular crime with the fault element required by 
law for the crime.89 The court went further on to state that where there are two or more 
perpetrators then they are referred to as co-perpetrators. This is different from an accomplice 
in that he is neither a perpetrator nor a co perpetrator; acts performed by him do not constitute 
a component of the actus reus of that particular crime. This position is supported by the 
decision in S v Msomi90, where the court stated that an accomplice is liable for a crime on the 
                                                          
86 Rex v M and Another 1950 (4) SA 101 (T) at page 490. 
87 Snyman supra note 23 at page 273. 
88 S v Kimberly and Another 2005 ZASCA 78 
89 S v Kimberley and Another (unreported, referred to as 2005 ZASCA 78). 
90 S v Msomi 2010 (2) SACR 173(KZP), at para 130. 
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basis of his or her contribution in the carrying out of an offence which he or she can not 
commit as a perpetrator.  
 
3.2 Accomplice liability in terms of section 1 (1) (b) of the CPA 
The accomplice liability in the crime of robbery with aggravating circumstances, as defined 
by section 1 (1) (b) of the CPA and the way in which the constitutional court has decided on 
the issue in the Masingili judgement has received some criticism by the writers of the 
Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act.91  
 
The Mirror image principle 
The constitutional court in Masingili stated that the words ‘or accomplice’ which are in 
section 1 (1) (b) of CPA are relevant in mirror image cases where the aggravating 
circumstances were used by the accomplice.92 Du Toit in the Commentary book has 
expressed different a view which is different from the above judgement of the Constitutional 
Court. He stated that where the aggravating circumstances are performed by the accomplice 
the perpetrator should not be guilty of robbery with aggravating circumstances, but should be 
guilty of robbery, when we use the common law principle of accomplice liability. Du Toit 
went on further and stated that they do not have the problem if such conduct is imputed to the 
perpetrator by using the common purpose principles.93  
      The constitutional court in Masingili put too much focus on the nature of the crime of 
robbery with aggravating circumstances and on the problems encountered in R v Sisilane, 
where the Appellate Division held that a getaway driver, was not a party to the commission 
of the aggravating circumstances, because the aggravating circumstances only arose in the 
course of the robbery, which robbery he was not a perpetrator of, but an accomplice to it. The 
court reasoned, at the time, that the absence of the words ‘by the offender or an accomplice” 
in subsection (b) of the CPA of 1956 after the amendment of 1958, meant that someone could 
be guilty of robbery with aggravating circumstances only if he instigated or otherwise made 
                                                          
91 E Du Toit…et al. Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act. (2015) 31-25 DEF (hereinafter referred to as  
    the Commentary). 
92 The court further stated that, the courts in R v Sisilane supra note 42 and in S v Dhlamini supra note 51, were 
wrong to say that the addition of the words “or accomplice” in section 1 (1) (b) of the CPA extend the liability 
to the accomplice, when it is the perpetrator who committed aggravating circumstances, since that is done by 
common law accomplice principle. 
93 The commentary supra note 91 at the last sentence of DEF 5 and the first para of DEF 6. 
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himself a party to the aggravating circumstances.94  It is our view, that by the court focusing 
too much on the nature of this crime, the court failed to properly develop this crime of 
robbery to suit well the Constitutional era of South Africa. 
Does section 1 (1) (b) of the CPA extend criminal liability to the accomplice? 
Further when one view at how the Court treated an accomplice liability in the decision of S v 
Chauke95 where the accused was found guilty of the rape of a 16 year old girl and his co- 
accused was found guilty for being an accomplice. The High court held that the regional 
court should have sentenced the accused as the Minimum Sentence Act was not applicable to 
the co-accused as he was an accomplice and the Court referred the matter back to the regional 
court for sentencing.   
      The above case law was also used by one of the leading academic commentators in law of 
sentencing, in his book, that is Professor Terblanche, when he was advancing the same point 
of view that participation in an offence like being an accomplice or an attempt should not 
amount to committing the offence which is covered by the Minimum Sentence Act.96  
      In light of how the accomplice is treated in other crimes, in particular in the case of S v 
Chauke above, this paper submit that the Constitutional Court in Masingili, made an error 
when it concluded that the insertion of the words ‘or accomplice’ to the section was not 
extending the liabilities of the accomplice to cases of robbery with aggravating 
circumstances.97 
 
3.3 Intention element in robbery with aggravating circumstances (Strict liability) 
Intention comprises of two elements, cognitive and conative elements. The cognitive element 
is where the perpetrator must have knowledge of the act, the elements of the crime and of its 
unlawfulness and the conative element where the perpetrator directs his will towards a certain 
act.98 Intention may take the form of dolus directus, dolus indirectus and dolus eventualis. 
 
 
                                                          
94 R v Sisilane supra note 42. 
95 S v Chauke 2006 (1) SACR 117 (W) at para 3-4.  
96 SS Terblanche The Guide to sentencing in South Africa 3rd ed (2016) 59.  
97 Masingili supra note 2 at pages 446 to 447. It criticised the way in which the Sisilane judgement dealt with the 
definition of accomplice liability, since the Sisilane judgement had stated that the section will extend liability to 
the accomplice when the perpetrator commits aggravating circumstances. 
98  Du Toit A “Minister of Justice and Another v Masingili and Another Constitutional Law”, Review 2015. 
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What is strict liability? 
The concept of strict liability in South African law is used to refer to no fault liability, which 
is liability without proof of intention or negligence. At common law, a person could be held 
liable for unintended consequences of an illegal activity under the doctrine of versari in re 
illicita. This doctrine meant that a person could be held criminally liable without proving the 
fault requirement on his part, thereby creating liability without fault. This doctrine was 
however dealt away with by the Appellate division in Die Staat v Van Der Mescht99 which 
was of the view that the versari doctrine was not in accordance with contemporary traits of 
criminal law and our courts should not follow it.  
      It is important to note that the test for intention is a subjective test, which requires a court 
to look at the particular state of mind of the perpetrator when the act was committed. The 
Constitutional Court  should have inferred the intention from the facts to establish and 
determine the accomplice’s state of mind with regards to aggravating circumstances and at 
least imputed liability through the application of the doctrine of common purpose or through 
dolus eventualis as it would have been a stronger argument,  rather than to simply state that 
intention with regards to the crime of robbery is enough to impute liability to an accomplice 
on a charge of robbery with aggravating circumstances.  
      It is the writer’s argument that the section as it stands is not properly constructed, and 
furthermore, since it was created during the times when strict liability concept was common 
in South African criminal law, and the section as it currently stand has got echo and negative 
connotation of strict liability. We argue and state that it will be a good idea for this crime to 
be developed properly to suit the current period of the South African constitutional era.  
      The Court further found that robbery with aggravating circumstances is not a new crime, 
but it is a form of robbery where there are aggravating circumstances, and the ‘intention’ with 
regards to aggravating circumstances is not relevant to the enquiry.100 The writer states that 
this cannot be correct as such situation creates a scenario where a court can convict a person 
without taking into consideration whether or not the accused person intended the use of 
aggravating circumstances. As argued above the fault is generally met by proof of intent in 
one of its recognised forms, or by the objective requirement of negligence. Therefore it is this 
                                                          
99  Die Staat v Van Der Mescht 1962 (1) SA 521 (A).  
100 Masingili supra note 2 at page 454 para 48. 
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paper’s argument that it would not be proper in the current constitutional era, for the court to 
simply impute intention of aggravating circumstance on an every accused person.   
Does robbery and robbery with aggravating circumstances really have the same 
definitional elements? 
The argument of the writer is that the definitional elements of a mere robbery in comparison 
to that of robbery with aggravating circumstances are not really the same, and that is why this 
paper states that the intention to use aggravating circumstances should form part of 
definitional elements of the crime of robbery with aggravating circumstances. This paper’s 
position to be argued later is supported by Bishop and Brickhill who point out that the 
element of violence in aggravated robbery is different from the element of violence in a mere 
robbery.101 
      When one look at how well couched the definitional elements of the crime of assault with 
intent to cause grievous bodily harm, the writer is of the view that the same should have 
happened in the crime of robbery with aggravating circumstances. The crime of assault with 
intent to do grievous bodily harm recognises that ‘intention’ must be present with regards to 
the causing grievous bodily harm. Therefore, for this reason, our argument is that intention 
with regards to the aggravating circumstances must be treated as forming part of the 
definitional element required for the crime of robbery with aggravating circumstances.  
 
SA Constitution 
It is difficult to accept, Van der Westhuizen J's view that insufficient fault requirement and a 
violation of the presumption of innocence are conceptually two different things.102 This is 
because the very fact that, one, there is insufficient fault equipment violates the presumption 
of innocence in the sense that the moment you remove intention from the inquiry 
automatically you will have violated the presumption of innocence. The approach of the 
Constitutional Court is divergent to the view taken by our courts, in that courts are very 
reluctant to interpret statutes which contain no provision with regards to intention as not 
requiring intention.103  
It has been argued by the legal commentator, Louw, ‘that the right to be presumed innocent in 
statutory offences does not mean the right to be presumed innocent of a crime as it happens to 
be defined by the legislature, but, rather, once we take into account what is proper and 
                                                          
101 M Bishop and J Brickhill “Constitutional Law.” 2013 (4) Juta`s Quarterly Review 2.4 at 2.4.2. 
102 Masingili supra note 2 at page 456 para 58. 
103 S v Coetzee and Others  1997 (3) SA 527(CC)  
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necessary in the shape and construction of criminal offences, the right to be presumed 
innocent of a crime that is required to contain an element of fault.’104  
Therefore the role of culpability is of paramount importance in the SA criminal law and in 
particular for SA constitution. As a result of that the writer’s view, is that the constitutional 
court in Masingili did not remain faithful to the spirit and thrust of the constitution by 
allowing form and technicality to trump over constitutional substance.105As a result the court 
in its strict interpretation of section 1 (1) (b) of the CPA, failed to consider that by negating 
the requirement of intention with regards to aggravating circumstances they were 
reintroducing a muted version of the versari doctrine of criminal liability without culpability. 
This has the net effect of violating the right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the Constitution106 
in section 35 (3) of an accused in that a person will be held liable for a crime without any 
moral blameworthiness. 
      Lastly on this issue of intention, this paper view is that the Constitutional Court in 
Masingili concerned itself much with the submission which was placed by the parties in the 
case in order to make the decision. That is why the court did failed to properly develop this 
crime and it allowed the form of the section 1 (1) (b) of the CPA to trump over the 
substantive crime.  
 
3.4.Robbery with aggravating circumstance as a stand-alone crime 
How the crime had been applied by SA courts? 
The Constitutional Court in Masingili, expressly stated that robbery with aggravating 
circumstances is not a stand-alone crime. It went on to state that:- 
 “Robbery with aggravating circumstances is thus robbery where a fire-arm 
or other dangerous weapon is wielded, or where grievous bodily harm is 
inflicted or threat of violence. The provision must be understood in context.  
It does not, in itself, create an offence or impose liability.  Further section 1 
(1) (b) of CPA, provides a definition of “aggravating circumstances” in 
relation to robbery, not a definition of robbery.”107  
                                                          
104 R Louw, Specific Crimes   South African Journal of Criminal Justice, Vol. 11, Issue 1 (1998), pp. 120-123. 
105 The commentary supra note 91. 
106 The SA Constitution supra note 68. 
107 Masingili supra note 2. 
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The Court was of the view that aggravating circumstances only come into considerations at 
the sentencing stage of a trial. The State does not have to prove intent with regards to them 
during the verdict stage of a trial. The Court further went on to state that “It is correct that, in 
specifying an enhanced penal jurisdiction for particular forms of an existing offence, the 
Legislature does not create a new type of offence.  Thus ‘robbery with aggravating 
circumstances’ is not a new offence.”108 
      This position that robbery with aggravating circumstances is not a separate crime is in 
principle correct, through a strict interpretation of section 1 (1) (b) of the CPA. In getting to 
this position the Constitutional Court did not consider well that in a practical sense robbery 
with aggravating circumstances is treated differently from robbery by our courts. The 
treatment of robbery with aggravating circumstances and mere robbery as two distinct crimes 
signifies an evolution of robbery with aggravating circumstances into a stand-alone crime, 
separate from robbery. More over in practise the two are treated differently for the purposes 
of both bail and prescriptions as will be explained further below. 
      The evidence of development of the law through practice can be seen in other closely 
related crimes such assault and assault with intent to cause grievous bodily harm which have 
developed into two separate crimes. For example, in cases of assault GBH ultimate aim for 
the requirement for intention to cause grievous bodily harm is for sentencing as assault with 
intention to cause grievous bodily harm attract a harsher sentence than assault common. 
      In S v Isaacs and Another109 the court stated that the contention that no onus attached to 
proof of aggravating circumstances is flawed and the state has the onus to prove aggravating 
circumstances prior to conviction in light of the presumption of innocence and the signifying 
impact on aggravating circumstances on the length of the sentence imposed by the court. This 
reflect that our courts sometimes recognize and appreciate that robbery and robbery with 
aggravating circumstances are two different crimes with their own definitional elements. In 
the Legoa case above, the Court went on further to state that:- 
‘Apart from the fact that robbery with aggravating circumstances attracts a minimum 
sentence, it has further significance.  The right to prosecute robbery with aggravating 
circumstances does not prescribe, whereas the right to prosecute robbery prescribes after 
20 years.  It is also more difficult for a person charged with robbery with aggravating 
circumstances to be granted bail than it is for a person charged with mere robbery.’  
                                                          
108 Ibid. 
109 S v Isaacs and Another 2007 (1) SACR 43 (C). 
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The above cases are further practical evidence that robbery with aggravating circumstances is 
morphing into a different crime from mere robbery with different consequences with regards 
to not only sentencing but substantial issues like prescription and bail. Further, the very fact 
that robbery with aggravating circumstances expressly requires the use of a fire arm or 
dangerous weapon, or the threat of violence is different from mere robbery and the legislature 
through section 1 (1) (b) of the CPA unknowingly through the wording of this section have 
created a new crime and it is now up to the courts or the legislature to endorse this view. 
      In S v Mokela,110 as per Bosielo JA, expressed that a previous conviction of robbery 
should not be regarded as a previous offence of “robbery with aggravating 
circumstances” for purposes of the sentencing and in particular as far as the provisions of the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act.111 The court went on distinguished robbery with aggravating 
circumstances and robbery as two different crimes, albeit it was in the application of section 
51 (2) of the CPA. This is evidence that the courts have tacitly acknowledged that robbery 
and robbery with aggravating circumstances are evolving into two different crimes. In that 
the Supreme Court of Appeal has no problem with interpretation of robbery with aggravating 
circumstances as different from robbery with regards to previous crimes.  
      The above position was reiterated in S v Qwabe112 , wherein the court in determining 
whether the accused was a 'second offender' on a charge of robbery with aggravating 
circumstances, held that the legislation section 51 (2) (a) (ii)113 relating to a minimum 
sentence would not be triggered by a previous conviction of robbery; it would require a 
conviction of robbery with aggravating circumstances to do so. In this case of S v Qwabe the 
court treated robbery with aggravating circumstances as a separate crime different from 
robbery. It is unquestionable that section 1 (1) (b) CPA presents 'aggravating circumstances' 
in a way that proposes that they are conditional to the existence of the crime of robbery, and 
that no new or distinct crime is being created by the addition of the words to section 1 (1) b of 
the CPA.  
 
Does section 1 (1) (b) create a new crime of robbery with aggravating circumstances? 
Unarguably the result of section 1 (1) (b) of the CPA is to fashion a distinctive and 
significantly severe 'criminal status', in terms of which more serious criminal consequences 
                                                          
110 S v Mokela 2012 (1) SACR 431 (SCA) at para 6. 
111 Also referred to as Minimum Sentence Act supra. 
112 S v Qwabe 2012 (1) SACR 347 (WCC) 2012. 
113 Minimum Sentence Act supra. 
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than that of mere robbery must be imposed upon an accused unless substantial and 
compelling circumstances exist which justify the imposition of a lesser sentence with regards 
to robbery with aggravating circumstances.114 The considerably amplified punitive and social 
consequences to which an accused is subjected to when aggravating circumstances are 
present in the crime of robbery warrant this type of robbery to be treated as a different crime 
from common robbery. The courts cannot put a blind faith in the legislature’s failure to 
identify armed robbery formally as separate crimes and rely on that to the detriment of their 
duty to develop common law. 
       The argument adopted by the Constitutional Court, that the legislature could not have 
intended robbery with aggravating circumstances to be a different crime, it may be true but 
the court should not have turned a blind eye on the time of parliamentary supremacy, which 
is the time this crime was created in the South African law. Those were the times when the 
Bill of Rights and the Constitutional Supremacy did not exist. Therefore it is submitted that 
the constitutional court in Masingili was insufficiently faithful to the spirit and thrust of the 
Constitution.115 In that by a strictly interpreting robbery with aggravating circumstances the 
court is negating on one of its fundamental constitutional function which is to develop the 
common law.116  
      It is submitted that the in interpreting section 1 (1) (b) of the CPA to only look at the 
wording of the section is a bit naïve, this is because the court did not consider the practical 
application of this section. Robbery with aggravating circumstances deserves to be a stand-
alone crime. The narrow interpretation of robbery with aggravating circumstances is 
contradictory to the approach adopted by the High Courts. The practical application and 
interpretation of the law with regards to robbery with aggravating circumstances and robbery 
is evidenced by the different jurisdiction afforded to common robbery which is dealt in the 
district court by the magistrate whereas, the regional courts and higher courts have 
jurisdiction with regards to robbery with aggravating circumstances. 
      The constitutional court, in failing to develop the crime of robbery with aggravating 
circumstances adequately, failed to speak up in the constitutional dialogue that functions in 
South Africa between the various arms of the state. There is no reason why the crime of 
                                                          
114 A, Paizez “Robbery with aggravating circumstances and the constitutional validity of s 1 (1) (b) of the  
     Criminal Procedure Act; two conflicting decisions.” (2013) 2 Criminal Justice Review (Commentary on the  
     Criminal Procedure Act).  
115 The SA Constitution supra note 68. 
116 Ibid at s 39 (2) which reads: “When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or 
customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.” 
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robbery with aggravating circumstances and robbery cannot be two different crimes. 
Furthermore, there is no rule of law that prohibits the Court from executing such an 
extension. On the contrary, creating a new stand-alone crime would have enhanced the 
Court’s commitment to its obligation in section 39 (2) of the SA Constitution. According to 
the section the Court has the power to make any order that is just and equitable. Therefore 
taking into account that there is no law that prohibits the Court from executing such an 
extension, it is this paper's view that the court should have developed this crime of robbery 
with aggravating circumstances into becoming a stand-alone crime from robbery. Therefore, 
it is this paper’s conclusion that it was ripe for the court to develop this law by using section 
172 of the SA Constitution.117 
      The court’s remedial power is not limited to declaration of invalidity. In short s 172 (1) of 
the SA constitution give powers to the court to make any order that is just and equitable. In 
the case of Head of Department Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool 
Ermelo118 the constitutional court had decided in favour of developing the law and it made an 
order that did not follow on the prayers of the contesting parties. The court stated the 
following: 
“The litmus test will be whether considerations of justice and equity in a particular case 
dictate that the order be made. In other words the order must be fair and just within the 
context of a particular dispute.” The power to grant a just and equitable order is so wide 
and flexible that it allows courts to formulate an order that does not follow prayers in the 
notice of motion or some other pleading. This power enables courts to address the real 
dispute between the parties by requiring them to take steps aimed at making their conduct 
to be consistent with the Constitution. In Hoërskool Ermelo Moseneke DCJ declared: “A 
just and equitable order may be made even in instances where the outcome of a 
constitutional dispute does not hinge on constitutional invalidity of legislation or conduct. 
This ample and flexible remedial jurisdiction in constitutional disputes permits a court to 
forge an order that would place substance above mere form by identifying the actual 
underlying dispute between the parties and by requiring the parties to take steps directed at 
resolving the dispute in a manner consistent with constitutional requirements. In several 
                                                          
117 The SA Constitution supra note 68; s 172(1) states that: ‘When deciding a constitutional matter within its 
power, a court  (a) must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to 
the extent of the inconsistency; and (b) may make any order that is just and equitable, including — (i) an order 
limiting the retrospective effect of the declaration of invalidity; and (ii) an order suspending the declaration of 
invalidity for any period and on any conditions, to allow the competent authority to correct the defect’. 
118Head of Department Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 (2) SA 415 (CC). 
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cases, this Court has found it fair to fashion orders to facilitate a substantive resolution of 
the underlying dispute between the parties.”119  
We expected the Court in Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Another v 
Masingili and Others to expressly lay this issue to rest by giving a decision that was going to 
properly develop the crime of robbery with aggravating circumstances and the definition of it 
as defined by section 1 (1) (b) of the CPA. The development which would have ultimate 
result to push the legislature to enact a statute which will formally make robbery with 
aggravating circumstances to be a different crime to robbery, by evoking its inherent power 
to develop the common law.120 
Similarly Kemp in his book Criminal Law in South Africa is of the view that the crime of 
robbery and the crime of robbery with aggravating circumstances are two different crimes.121 
Also Burchell is critical of the judgement, in that the he is of the view that the court should 
have gone further and state that The State should prove whether the accomplice had the same 
intention as of the crime committed by the perpetrator, which is robbery with aggravating 
circumstances. If the intention were the same then the accomplice, according to Burchell, can 
be convicted for robbery with aggravating circumstances.122  
 
3.5.Two Stages of a Criminal Trial 
The criminal trial in SA law is divided into two stages. That is the first stage when the court 
will decide on the guilty or not guilty of the accused person and express the court verdict. 
And the second stage is when the court will decide on the appropriate sentence. 
 
Verdict Stage 
The first stage concerns of the trial, which will prove the guilt or innocence of the accused on 
the offence charged. This is the stage where the accused has to be proved either guilty or 
innocent; the burden of proof at this stage rests with the prosecution which has to prove that, 
the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt to secure a conviction. This means that the 
judge and assessors must be satisfied that there is no reasonable possibility that the accused is 
                                                          
119 See also, the decision of the case between Economic Freedom Fighters and Others v The Speaker of The 
National Assembly and Another CCT 76/17 page 88 par 209. 
120 The SA Constitution supra; s 172. “The Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal and the High 
Court of South Africa each has the inherent power to protect and regulate their own process, and to develop the 
common law, taking into account the interests of justice.” 
121 Kemp supra note 25 at page 423.  
122 J Burchell, Principles of Criminal Law 5th ed. (2016) 733. 
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innocent before he is convicted. The rationale for the higher test is that everyone’s freedom is 
fundamental; that a criminal penalty is a very grave harm to impose; and that it is better to let 
the guilty go free than to punish the innocent. Requiring proof “beyond reasonable doubt” 
means that criminal punishment is imposed only when the court is very sure of the accused’s 
guilt. It is hard to give any definition more precise than that. After a court is satisfied that the 
state has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, it then can convict an accused and move to 
sentencing the accused. 
  
Sentencing Stage 
The second stage of trial concerns the question of sentence. The sentence is defined as, any 
measure applied by a court to a person convicted of a criminal offense which finalises a 
case123. The general underlying principle with regards to sentencing is that the punishment 
should fit the crime, be fair to society and it must be blended with a measure of mercy 
according to the circumstances.124   A sentence must also consider the following purposes of 
punishment namely retribution, deterrence, prevention and rehabilitation.125 In cases of more 
serious crimes the court is guided by the Criminal Law Amendment Act126 on what sentence 
it has to impose on an accused. The sentences provided by the Act vary from 5 years to Life 
imprisonment, depending on the type of the offense and the part it falls under in terms of this 
Act.  
      During the sentencing stage in principle there is no onus of proof that needs to be 
satisfied127 even though the presumption of innocence does not apply to sentencing as the 
accused has already been convicted, the court in S v Shephard128 stated that; ‘ it is anomalous 
to give the accused benefit of all reasonable doubt before finding him guilty then when 
dealing with a question that may make a vast difference to his sentence to place the onus on 
him so that the Court if it finds the probabilities equally balanced in relation to some 
mitigating fact, will punish him for a fact that does not exist.’  The court has to conduct a 
factual inquiry to ascertain whether the particular aggravating or mitigating circumstances 
exist before handing down a sentence. 
 
                                                          
123 JJ Joubert. Criminal Procedure Handbook 12 ed. (2017) 374. 
124 S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 855 (A).  
125 S v Nkambule 1993 (1) SARC 136 (A) at page 146 C.  
126 Minimum Sentence Act supra. 
127 R v Van Zell 1953 (4) SA 552 (A) at 561. 
128  S v Shepard and others 1967 (4) SA 170 (W).  
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3.5.1.  An analysis on how the constitutional court in Minister of Justice and Another v 
Masingili and Another treated the two stages of the trial.  
The Constitutional Court in Masingili held that the aggravating circumstances in a case of 
robbery with aggravating circumstances are only relevant for the second stage of the trial; 
namely, sentencing. This position in principle, on a strict interpretation of the law is correct.  
However, it is contrary to the approach that had been adopted and developed in the Supreme 
Court and the High Court. 
      The decision by the Constitutional Court is contrary to the precedent set in S v Legoa,129 
wherein, the court went to great lengths to allude that procedural fairness dictates and has 
impelled our courts to require that proof of intention of aggravating circumstances be proved 
during the verdict stage of a criminal trial. The court was of the view that the inquiry into the 
two stage process is a fluid process in that the two stage process of a criminal trial is not a 
rigid concept cast in stone which requires strict adherence to the separation of the two stages 
of the criminal trial. 
      The Court in S v Legoa rightly held that aggravating circumstances should be proved 
before conviction as it would be unfair to suddenly confront a convicted person with an 
enhanced penal code at the sentencing stage. It further stated that it is proper for the State to 
give sufficient notice to the accused that they would be confronted with a harsher and more 
severe sentence during the conviction stage.130The position stated in S v Legoa is in line with 
the constitutional principle which requires clearness and notification to an accused of all the 
implications of a trial so that he or she can address the State’s case comprehensively 
including being able to prepare for the sentencing inquiry.131 This is encompassed on the 
criminal law principle of legality. 
      A strict interpretation of the two stage trial as stated in Masingili has the effect of 
ignoring the fact that for practical purposes in cases of robbery with aggravating 
circumstances the courts have always treated “aggravating factors” as elements of the form of 
the offence which the accused was charged, hence they had to be proved in the first stage of 
the trial, and the finding regarding their presence or absence was part of the main verdict.132 
The Constitutional Court decision in the case of Masingili decided that the aggravating 
circumstances will be considered relevant for sentencing, cannot be viewed as correct. Du 
                                                          
129 S v Legoa supra note 71.  
130 Ibid at para 20. 
131Veldman v Director of Public Prosecutions, Witwatersrand Local Division 2007 (3) SA 210(CC); at para 37.  
132 S v Jacobs 1961 (1) SA 474 (A), S v Sparks 1972 (3) SA 396 (A) 404. 
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Toit does not agree with how the highest Court in matters of SA constitution treated this issue 
and their view in the Commentary was that robbery with aggravating circumstances is a 
distinct offence from robbery.133  
In the case of R v Zonele and others134 the court held that:-  
‘Although aggravating circumstances affect sentencing only, it is very importance that a 
person charged with robbery or with housebreaking with intent to commit an offence 
should be informed, in clear terms that the Crown alleges and intends to prove that 
aggravating circumstances were present. 
It is desirable that the facts which the Crown intends to prove as constituting aggravating 
circumstances should be set out in the indictment, as was done in the present case. Without 
laying down any rule, I venture to suggest, for the consideration of Attorneys-General, that 
it might be good practice to go further and, in addition, to allege specifically that the 
accused is charged with robbery (or with housebreaking with intent to commit an offence) 
in which aggravating circumstances were present…’135 
      In S v Moloto136 and S v Benjamin,137 the Appellate Division reiterated the position that in 
cases of robbery with aggravating circumstances, aggravating circumstances must be proven 
in the verdict stage as they are central in both stages of the trial. Consequently in practice 
aggravating circumstances are treated as elements of the crime of robbery with aggravating 
circumstances; effectively making it a distinct offence in its own right. Whereas the 
Constitutional Court in Masingili did not view robbery with aggravating circumstances as a 
separate crime from robbery. 
3.6.Concluding Remarks  
The decision of the court in Masingili although in principle is correct when one considers that 
section 1 (1) (b) of the CPA does not create a new crime, but it failed to take into 
consideration that law is dynamic and fluid and it is up to it to be at the forefront of this 
development. There is enough evidence that our courts are shifting towards recognising 
robbery with aggravating circumstances as a different crime from common robbery. In the 
                                                          
133 Du Toit A “Minister of Justice and Another v Masingili and Another Constitutional Law”. Supra note 98. 
134 R v Zonele 1959 (3) SA 319 (A). 
135 Ibid. 
136 S v Moloto 1980 (1) SA 950 (A) at page 850 par 13 C-D. 
137 S v Benjamin en n Ander 1980 (1) SA 950 (A). 
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case in discussion the Constitutional Court missed an opportunity to follow on this positive 
path of interpreting robbery with aggravating circumstances as different crime from robbery.  
      In Masiya v DPP138the Constitutional Court developed the common law crime of Rape, 
which was recognising only the vaginal penetration of the victim as a rape case. The 
Constitutional Court in Masiya v DPP also recognised and treated anal penetration to female 
by the offender as rape. The legislature then enacted the Sexual Offences Amendment Act, 32 
of 2007. Therefore the above case of Masiya v DPP serves as a precedent and as evidence to 
support the view of this paper, to prove that the Constitutional Court has got powers to 
develop the common law to be consistent with SA Constitution and the bill of rights in South 
Africa. 
      Professor Hoctor raised good and proper arguments when he was analysing the 
Constitutional Court decision of the case of Masiya v DPP, and the court’s power to develop 
the common law. Since he emphasised that it is important for the Courts when developing the 
common law to take into account the principles of legality.139 
      The Constitutional Court has overturned many years of jurisprudence with regards to 
interpretation of the effect of aggravating circumstances and its relevance on the two stages 
of the trial, by adopting a formalistic and rigid interpretation. The approach adopted the by 
the Constitutional Court has the effect of strangling the development of robbery with 
aggravating circumstances and prevent it from being a stand-alone crime. Furthermore, the 
approach under discussion fails to pass the constitutional muster in the sense that it has got 











                                                          
138 Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions 2007 (5) SA 30 (CC). 
139 See for example S Hoctor “Recent cases: Specific crimes.” (2007), 1 SACJ 78 at 86. 








CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION 
4.1. Overview 
The Constitutional Court in Masingili adopted a particularly narrow reading of section 1 (1) 
(b) of the CPA by failed to develop it properly and treat it as a separate crime from mere 
robbery. The Court conducted a thorough discussion of the historical development of 
aggravating circumstances, through an analysis of the following three main cases of Cain; 
Sisilane; and Dhlamini, cases mentioned in chapter 1 above. These three cases had been the 
authority on the history of robbery with aggravating circumstances after its inception in 1958. 
       The definition of robbery where there are aggravating circumstances is found in section 1 
(1) (b) of the CPA. The question that had to be solved by the Constitutional Court in 
Masingili was simply whether the section violates the constitution of the country or not, that 
is a right to a fair trial and a right to be presumed innocent of the Constitution.140 The Court 
reached the conclusion that the section does not violate the Bill of Rights. In reaching that 
conclusion, the Court had to decide whether or not robbery with aggravating circumstances is 
a separate offence from common robbery. In answering this question, the Constitutional 
Court came to the conclusion that robbery where there are aggravating circumstances is not a 
new crime; therefore, for all intents and purposes it is still robbery.  
       The court in Masingili paid a lip service to Legoa and Moloto judgements, which were of 
the view that robbery with aggravating circumstances was developing into a new crime and 
further, that intention with regards to aggravating circumstances had to be proved for one to 
be found guilty of robbery with aggravating circumstances. Bearing in mind that there was no 
argument from the parties to request the Constitutional Court to develop this crime, but the 
Court still had an obligation to do so.  
                                                          
140 The SA Constitution supra note 68. 
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      The decision in Masingili has the implication of meaning that a person can be found 
guilty of robbery with aggravating circumstances even though there is no evidence proven by 
the State that he had intention to use or cause such aggravating circumstances during the 
robbery. Procedurally and substantively it does not sound correct, to say that a person will be 
found guilty of robbery with aggravating circumstances when the evidence points to fact  that 
he is guilty of robbery only. 
       In practice, robbery and robbery with aggravating circumstances are treated by our courts 
as different crimes, as argued in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. This is highlighted by the fact 
that robbery and robbery with aggravating circumstances are treated differently for the 
purposes of bail applications by the CPA, in that it is more difficult for an accused to be 
granted bail when they are being charged with robbery with aggravating circumstances than 
for an accused being charged with common robbery; the prescription periods are not the 
same; and their legislation under both the CPA and the Minimum Sentencing Act. Even when 
one looks at robbery and the fact that it has got less harsh punishment than robbery with 
aggravating circumstances it makes sense to not treat these crimes in the same scale. It is 
clear that they are not the same.  
      The court in  Masingili went contrary to  the norm that, a person can only be found guilty 
where there is both the actus rea and the mens rea to commit the crime are present. The 
Court stated that the State does not have to prove the intention to commit aggravating 
circumstances as the element of this crime. The doctrine of criminal culpability states that 
peoples can only be punished for the choices they make freely, knowingly and with the full 
appreciation of the actions consenting. This statement supports the legal principle which says, 
that an accused can be found guilty of a crime where blameworthiness in the form of 
intention is present and proven against him.  
The court in Masingili, wrongly decided, that intention with regards to aggravating 
circumstances was irrelevant and the State did not need to prove it during the first stage of the 
trial. This sounded like the court turned a blind eye to how this crime is treated in practical 
sense by our courts.  Most courts were requiring the intention to be proven as an element for 
crime of robbery with aggravating circumstances. That is why I think they were regarding it 
as a separate crime hence to prove the intention with regards to aggravating circumstances 
was regarded as central in the application of such cases. 
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      In South African Constitutional era, the constitutional values and norms demand that for 
an accused to be convicted of a crime there must be culpability on the part of the accused; 
and further, it is always important for a State to prove a case beyond reasonable doubt, in 
criminal cases. 
       In Masingili the court, though not evident in the words from the judgement; but one can 
see that the court was cautious not to interfere with the legislature and not to break the rules 
or principle of doctrine of separation of powers. It did that by not interfering with the 
wording or purpose of the legislature in its interpretation of section 1 (1) (b) of the CPA.  
By so doing the Court missed the opportunity to develop a common law crime, since the 
constitution of South Africa had given the court with a duty to develop the common law.  
In adopting a narrow interpretation of section 1 (1) (b) of the CPA the Constitutional Court 
failed to take into account the ratio decidendi set out in Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund 
v Endumeni Municipality141 on the interpretation of legislation. In Natal Joint Municipal 
Pension Fund, the Supreme Court of Appeal expressly stated that courts must avoid putting 
too much emphasis on the intention of the legislature, the case set out a new approach to 
statutory interpretation when it stated that:-  
“It clearly adopts as the proper approach to the interpretation of documents the second of 
the two possible approaches mentioned by Schreiner JA in Jaga v Dönges NO and 
another1, namely that from the outset one considers the context and the language together, 
with neither predominating over the other. This is the approach that courts in South Africa 
should now follow, without the need to cite authorities from an earlier era that are not 
necessarily consistent and frequently reflect an approach to interpretation that is no longer 
appropriate.”142 
      The Constitutional Court, had it adopted what was referred to in Natal Pension Fund as 
the new trend in statutory interpretation it would have arrived at a different outcome. The 
Court in Masingili would have inevitably arrived at the conclusion that the implication of 
section 1 (1) (b) of the CPA is that the legislation has created a new crime of robbery with 
aggravating circumstances which is different from the common law robbery. This would have 
meant that intention with regards to aggravating circumstances would have been required in 
terms of the aggravating circumstances.  
                                                          
141 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA). 
142 Ibid.  
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     The Constitutional Court in the Masingili case gave too much weight on the intention of 
the legislature with regards to the wording of section 1 (1) (b) of the CPA. In giving too much 
weight to the intention of the legislature when interpreting the statute in question, the 
Constitutional Court ended up disregarding authority from the various High Courts and 
Supreme Court of Appeal which points to the evolution of robbery with aggravating 
circumstances into a different crime. 
      The failure by the Constitutional Court to develop robbery with aggravating 
circumstances into a separate crime from robbery is regrettable given that our higher courts, 
which include the Constitutional Court has a the power and duties to develop the common 
law.  
      The inherent duty for our courts to develop the common law has been enshrined in 
section 173143 of the SA Constitution which expressly states that:-  
“The Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of Appeal and High Courts have the inherent 
power to protect and regulate their own process, and to develop the common law, taking into 
account the interests of justice.”144 
       The Constitutional Court in this regard had constitutional duty and an obligation to 
develop robbery with aggravating circumstances into a new crime, just as other crimes which 
were once viewed as the same crime, for example, assault with intent to cause grievous 
bodily harm is a species of common assault which has been developed by our courts into a 
stand-alone crime. In the case at issue the interests of justice require that an accused has a 
right to a fair a trial, and the principle of legality plays an important role in that regard. 
       Snyman145 states under the topic of principles of legality, that ‘the crime must be clear in 
terms’. If robbery and robbery with aggravating circumstances can become two separate 
crimes, the development will make it easier for most people to understand it easily, more 
especially the lay people.  
      Further, the Court Masingili misdirected itself in stating that on an interpretation of 
section 1 (1) (b) of the CPA aggravating circumstances are only relevant for sentencing and 
further that a court must only inquire into aggravating circumstances after an accused has 
been convicted. This is contrary to the approach that had existed and adopted by SA courts, 
                                                          
143 The SA Constitution supra note 68 at s 173. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Snyman supra note 23 at page 36. 
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which had stated that for the purposes of procedural fairness and justice, a court must 
establish the intention element of aggravating circumstances during the verdict stage of a 
criminal trial. The position adopted by the Constitutional Court with regards separation of the 
verdict and sentencing stages of a trial has the effect of creating an artificial rigid and strict 
separation of what must be inquired into at both sentencing and verdict stage.  
 
 
5.2. Concluding Remarks 
There is a need for robbery with aggravating circumstances to be classified as a separate 
crime as argued in the discussion above. This is because it has evolved into a different crime 
to mere robbery in almost every aspect. The crime of robbery should be developed either 
through legislative intervention or through our courts exercising their inherent powers to 
develop and promote common law.  
       This paper does not support what was said by Farlam J in S v Mintoor 1996 (1) SACR 
514 (C),when he refused to extend the crime of theft of electricity, and stated that it was not 
appropriate for the ambit of our criminal law to be extended by courts as this was the 
discretion of the legislature.146 Section 173 of Act 108 of 1996 empowers the court to develop 
common law taking into account the interests of justice. Therefore, it is this paper’s argument 
that it would have not done much harm to both parties of the Masingili case to develop this 
crime to be a stand-alone crime from robbery. Whereas, on the contrary, a new development 
will bring a fresh and clear distinction between the two related crimes of robbery and robbery 








                                                          
146 S v Mintoor 1996 (1) SACR 514 (C) at 517 par a-b. 
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